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ABSTRACT. The purpose of the article is to provide analysis of conceptual back-
ground of the international tax competition, and its negative externality — the race 
to the bottom situation. We distinguished the three types of tax competition models, 
notably, traditional, asymmetric and Leviathan models. Also we analyzed briefly 
the main benefits and disadvantages of international tax competition in the modern 
world. Using both comparative and graphical analysis we provide a brief evalua-
tion of the dynamics of statutory corporate income tax rates in countries worldwide. 
For the purpose of such analysis we distinguished the four regions: Europe, Latin 
America, Africa and countries of the former USSR. We used panel data on statutory 
corporate income tax rates for 70 countries for the period of 2006–2015. We found that 
in the three regions, notably Europe, Latin America and countries of the former USSR 
there were no significant changes in statutory corporate income tax rates while in Af-
rican countries they have changed substantially. This can be explained by the weak-
ness of these tax systems, i.e. the countries compete with each other, primarily by 
reducing statutory tax rates. But in order to make some conclusions both about taxa-
tion of corporate income and possibility of the race-to-bottom situation occurrence in 
neighboring countries, the real tax rates, taking into account the tax incentives and 
eliminations should be considered in future research. The obtained results could be 
useful for the elaboration of guidelines in order to create an attractive investment 
climate both for domestic and non-resident investors.
KEYWORDS. International taxation; tax competition; investment; corporate income 
tax; race to the bottom; cross-country analysis.
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«ГОНКА УСТУПОК» В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ НАЛОГОВОЙ КОНКУРЕНЦИИ
АННОТАЦИЯ. Цель статьи заключается в рассмотрении концептуальных по-
ложений международной налоговой конкуренции и негативной экстерналии 
этого явления — «гонки уступок». Определено три типа моделей налоговой 
конкуренции, в частности, традиционные, ассиметричные и модели Левиафа-
на. Также представлен краткий анализ основных преимуществ и недостатков 
международной налоговой конкуренции в современных условиях. Используя 
методы сравнительного и графического анализа, представлена краткая оценка 
динамики номинальных ставок налога на доход корпораций в странах мира. 
Для целей анализа было выделено четыре региона: Европа, Латинская Аме-
рика, Африка и страны бывшего СССР и использованы данные по 70 странам 
мира за период 2006–2015 гг. Анализ показал, что в трех регионах мира (Европа, 
Латинская Америка и страны бывшего СССР) значительных изменений номи-
нальных ставок налога на доход корпораций не происходило, тогда как в стра-
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Introduction
Over the last years under the condi-
tions of globalization corporate income 
tax became a powerful policy instrument 
in the states’ competition that serves to 
attract foreign capital. Consequently, 
one of the main features of modern eco-
nomic systems, caused by globalization 
processes, is the international tax compe-
tition. The independent states inevitably 
should accept decisions on both the tax 
structure and level of taxes. The net effect 
is the difference in the tax burden creates 
the competitive economic climate for in-
ternationally mobile factors of produc-
tion, capital and labor. The international 
tax competition could give a substantial 
incentive both to improve the efficiency 
of tax systems in countries worldwide and 
to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) 
on a global scale. The simplest, and con-
sequently, the most popular way of inter-
national tax competition is the provision 
of tax incentives; the reduction of capital 
income tax rate is often regarded as an ef-
ficient tool for attracting investment. But 
if such a competition leads to negative 
tax externalities (arising primarily from 
capital movement), this refers to harmful 
tax competition and also the race-to-the-
bottom situation, which appears when 
states compete with each other, principal-
ly, for the investment capital, by lighten-
ing gradually the statutory and regulatory 
structure. Under current conditions an im-
portant aspect, especially for small devel-
oping countries, is to create an attractive 
investment climate both for domestic and 
non-resident investors. The system of cap-
ital taxation therefore should be organized 
in such a manner as to prevent the outflow 
of mobile factors to the jurisdictions with 
lower taxation; at the same time, the actu-
al tax regime should be attractive for FDI. 
The attraction into country’s economy the 
resources of profitable multinational com-
panies creates problems of avoiding of 
shifting the tax base of corporate income 
tax outside the country. 
In order to be able to elaborate some 
practical conclusions aimed at improv-
ing the country’s tax policy in the area of 
capital income taxation it is expedient to 
consider conceptual issues concerning in-
ternational tax competition and its exter-
nality — the race to the bottom situation. 
So, the purpose of the paper is to pro-
vide analysis of conceptual background of 
the international tax competition and the 
race to the bottom situation. It will also 
focus on brief analysis of the dynamics 
of statutory corporate income tax rates in 
countries worldwide. To do this we struc-
tured the paper as follows. Section 2 re-
views theoretical and empirical research 
on the international tax competition and 
race to the bottom. Section 3 provides brief 
theoretical background of tax competi-
tion, its benefits and disadvantages. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes the dynamics of capital in-
come tax rates in economics of the world. 
Finally, Section 5 presents some conclud-
ing remarks. 
Literature review
Some part of research studies the the-
oretical aspects of international tax com-
petition under conditions of globalization. 
Rudra (2008) in her book «Globaliza-
tion and the Race to the Bottom in Devel-
нах Африки наблюдались существенные трансформации этого показателя. Это 
можно объяснить слабостью налоговых систем этих стран, которая проявляется 
в том, что государства конкурируют друг с другом, прежде всего, за счет сокра-
щения номинальных ставок налогов. Однако для того, чтобы сделать выводы 
относительно налогообложения дохода корпораций и возможности возникно-
вения «гонки уступок» в соседствующих странах, последующие исследования 
предполагают анализ реальных ставок налогов, которые учитывают предостав-
ленные налоговые льготы. Полученные результаты могут быть использованы 
при разработке рекомендаций, направленных на создание благоприятного 
инвестиционного климата как для инвесторов-резидентов, так и нерезидентов. 
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА. Международное налогообложение; налоговая конку-
ренция; инвестиции; налог на доход корпораций; «гонка уступок»; межстра-
новой анализ.
Journal of Tax Reform. 2016. T. 2, № 2. С. 98–110
100
ISSN 2412-8872
oping Countries: Who Really Gets Hurt?» 
studied the interactions between global-
ization and the race to the bottom, domes-
tic politics, and welfare strategies in devel-
oping countries, focusing on the impact of 
the expansion of the international market 
on the welfare policies of least-developed 
countries. She argued that for develop-
ing countries, unlike the developed ones, 
globalization is not the main reason of oc-
currence the race to the bottom situation 
occurrence [1].
The Report of the Tax Justice Network 
(2012) showed that governments in East 
African countries provide a wide range of 
tax incentives, such as tax holidays, nota-
bly in export processing zones (EPZs), and 
reduced standard rates, notably, import 
duties and VAT in order to attract foreign 
direct investment. This study, focusing on 
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda, 
concluded that such tax benefits promote 
harmful tax competition, which leads to 
the race to the bottom in the region, and 
they are not needed to attract FDI [2].
Keen & Konrad (2013) provided a 
survey of the theory of international tax 
competition and factors, which determine 
countries’ decisions in the area of their tax 
policy in an international context [3].
Olney (2013) tested the hypothesis 
that globalization could lead to a race 
to the bottom situation. Notably, when 
multinational companies invest in econo-
mies with lower regulatory standards; 
simultaneously these countries continue 
to undercut such standards in order to at-
tract foreign direct investment. With two 
assumptions (multinational companies 
increase FDI in response to reductions in 
employment protection rules in the host 
country and economies undercut their 
labor standards in order to attract for-
eign capital). As a result he found that the 
employment protection rules could have 
a significant negative impact on foreign 
direct investment and the degree of such 
an impact depends on the type of FDI. 
Also he discovered a significant positive 
impact of labor standards on the employ-
ment protection rules, implemented in the 
host country. Therefore, Olney concluded 
that multinational companies invest pri-
marily in countries with lower regulatory 
standards, promoting therefore a race to 
the bottom, and, consequently, whether 
a race to the bottom is an intended effect 
depends on the employment protection 
rules [4].
Anguelov (2015) estimated the impact 
of change of marginal corporate tax rates 
on FDI and GDP. For this he used a multi-
ple regression analyses of several econom-
ic indicators, notably, multinational com-
panies’ mergers and acquisitions, trade 
bloc membership and multinational com-
panies’ incorporation for the period 1999–
2009 for 60 countries worldwide. The au-
thor found that reduction of corporate tax 
rates could lead to the increase of FDI but 
at the same time — to the decrease of an-
nual GDP growth. He concluded that the 
tax competition could attract the foreign 
direct investment, but may not contribute 
to the economic growth; when both the 
trade integration and ease of merger and 
acquisitions increase, the trend in harmo-
nizing tax rates decreases [5]. 
Another set of papers provides an em-
pirical estimation of the impact of changes 
of corporate income tax rates on different 
macroeconomic indicators. 
Bretschger & Hettich (2005) using the 
panel data of 12 OECD countries for the 
period 1967–1996 argued that globaliza-
tion had a negative impact on capital in-
come taxes. Thus, they found an evidence 
of the efficiency hypothesis of globaliza-
tion in the tax competition theory, accord-
ing to which the reduction of taxes on mo-
bile factors as opposed to immobile ones is 
more efficient for governments [6].
Devereux et al. (2008) analyzed the 
possible tax competition in OECD coun-
tries over corporate taxes. They developed 
a model in which multinational companies 
could choose their capital stock in response 
to an effective marginal tax rate, and simul-
taneously could choose the location of their 
profit according to different statutory tax 
rates. The authors tested the model using 
data from 21 countries for the period 1982–
1999 and found evidence that analyzed 
countries compete over both mentioned 
measures and they interact strategically 
only between open economies [7].
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Yao & Zhang (2008) estimated both 
the patterns and extent of strategic tax 
competition between geographically 
neighboring governments in China. Us-
ing a set of panel data at the county level 
and applying the local indicator of spatial 
association (LISA) approach they statis-
tically tested the existence of local capi-
tal tax competition and also analyzed its 
determining factors. The authors found 
heterogeneous tax competition behavior 
across country’s regions, where local gov-
ernments compete with each other in or-
der to attract mobile capital, lowering tax 
rates and creating thereby the race to the 
bottom situation [8]. 
Ali Abbas et al. (2012) analyzed the 
impact of corporate income tax regimes 
in 50 emerging and developing countries 
over 1996–2007 on both corporate tax rev-
enue and domestic and foreign invest-
ment. They estimated effective tax rates 
taking into account the special tax regimes 
like tax holidays, reduced rates and in-
vestment allowances. The authors found 
evidence of a partial race to the bottom, 
notably, no race to the bottom situation for 
standard tax systems in the sample com-
pared to advanced economies (except the 
sub-Saharan Africa) and the presence of 
race to the bottom for special tax regimes, 
where effective tax rates are close to zero, 
especially in the case of African countries. 
Also their regression analysis showed 
that higher tax rates adversely affect both 
domestic investment and FDI, but do in-
crease revenue in the short-run [9].
Vezina (2014) provided an empirical 
assessment of race-to-the-bottom unilat-
eralism. He suggested that decades of 
unilateral tariff cutting (in order to obtain 
marginal locational advantages) in emerg-
ing economies of Asia have been induced, 
at least in part, by a competition aimed 
to attract FDI from Japan. Using spatial 
econometrics, the author showed that tar-
iffs on parts and components, which could 
be considered as a crucial locational deter-
minant for Japanese firms, followed those 
of competing economies if the latter were 
lower, if the motivation to obtain FDI was 
high, and when competing countries had 
the similar level of development [10].
The research providing an empirical 
assessment in order to make conclusion 
of presence of race to the bottom situation 
is generally carried out for appropriate 
regions, where the possibility of its occur-
rence is high. Typically this is true for the 
European Union countries.
Krogstrup (2004) analyzed corporate 
tax rates in European Union countries in 
order to define whether there is a race to 
the bottom in corporate tax burden. She 
found that the tax competition impact on 
the corporate tax burden exists but it has 
a relatively small magnitude and could 
not be qualified as a race to the bottom. 
Also Krogstrup (2004) suggested that 
many other factors like agglomeration 
economies influence significantly on the 
corporate tax burden and could provide 
the counterweight to tax competition ef-
fects [11].
Mendoza & Tesar (2005) estimated 
quantitatively the key features of tax com-
petition in open economies in a two-coun-
try version with neoclassical balanced-
growth model. Further, they introduced 
some modifications, notably the possibili-
ty for the countries to differ as a net debtor 
and as a net creditor in the pre-tax-com-
petition equilibrium, the inelastic labor 
and lower capital adjustment costs. They 
found that both faster transitional dynam-
ics and asymmetries between net creditors 
and debtors could increase the benefits of 
tax coordination. These results allowed 
them to conclude that economies with rel-
atively inefficient tax systems could lose 
significantly in welfare if they compete 
by corporate income taxes against states 
with relatively efficient tax systems. Con-
sequently, the harmonization of indirect 
taxation could be regarded as undesirable 
since it induces countries to respond to the 
negative impact of tax competition on tax 
revenue by raising the distorting taxes on 
labor income [12].
Nicodème (2006) analyzed the infor-
mation about corporate income tax coor-
dination in European countries. He found 
that despite a substantial decline of the 
statutory income tax, the revenue collect-
ed from corporate taxation remained rela-
tively stable; and he concluded that there 
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is no evidence of a race-to-the-bottom sit-
uation in EU member countries [13].
Fourçans & Warin (2006) analyzed the 
question of the likelihood of occurrence of 
a race to the bottom situation, as a result 
of tax competition between countries, in a 
monetary union, like the Eurozone. In or-
der to analyze the conditions of a race to 
the bottom they applied a two-stage game 
model describing a bargaining situation 
between countries with costs of changing 
tax policies. The authors concluded that 
the tax competition is not a reason of ap-
pearance of a race to the bottom between 
European countries. Also they showed 
that if revoking costs do exist, tax harmo-
nization policies could not be regarded as 
useful if based upon concerns about race 
to the bottom [14].
Devereux & Loretz (2013) analyzed a 
tax competition in source-based corporate 
income taxes and classified an appropriate 
empirical literature, by highlighting the 
importance of the measurement of both 
tax rates and openness. They found that 
tax competition could take many forms 
and they concluded that there is evidence 
for tax competition mostly in the Europe-
an Union countries [15]. 
Dvořáková (2013) analyzed the tax 
competition in EU countries in order to 
determine whether the race to the bottom 
is real in the European Union. She used a 
regression analysis for the 1998–2010 on a 
sample of 27 Member States. The author 
found that there is no race to the bottom 
in all EU states, while such trends were 
detected only in the EU-12 group of new 
member countries. Taking into account 
that there is a considerable statistical de-
pendence between the revenue from cor-
porate income tax and the economic cycle, 
she supposed that the theory of the race to 
the bottom could be in phase with other 
factors in economy, notably if the eco-
nomic growth could be observed in some 
countries, then the reduction of tax rates 
to a certain minimum threshold will not 
have a negative impact on revenue from 
corporate income tax [16]. 
Baskaran & Fonseca (2014) analyzed 
both theoretical and empirical literature 
on local and international tax competi-
tion. Notably they discussed whether EU 
states should harmonize their tax policies 
and whether intergovernmental trans-
fers could be an effective tool in order to 
prevent a race to the bottom. The authors 
supposed that the tax competition did not 
have a negative impact on the tax revenue 
and they argued that the tax coordination 
was not necessary in order to prevent low 
levels of taxation in the EU countries. Bas-
karan & Fonseca (2014) concluded that 
now the case for substantial tax coordina-
tion in the EU countries is rather weak [17].
Azémar et al. (2015) using data from 
27 European Union countries for the pe-
riod 1981–2005, developed an analytical 
model of regional trade and investment 
where countries could be differed from 
each other by the size of domestic mar-
kets. They found that large countries ap-
ply higher corporate tax rates than their 
smaller competitors for FDI; market size 
also plays an important role: larger mar-
kets are less responsive to corporate tax 
rates changes [18]. 
Theoretical background
The tax competition could be regarded 
as the use of low tax rates by governments 
in order to attract additional productive 
resource (primarily capital and labor) to 
their countries. 
Teather (2005) determined a two-stage 
effect of international tax competition on 
the world’s tax systems: 
– some pioneer countries would re-
duce their tax rates in order to offer low 
effective tax rates for potential investors;
– other countries could lower their own 
taxes to compensate expected or actual loss-
es occurred from this competition [19].
In order to understand the nature of 
international tax competition let’s con-
sider the main theories of tax competition, 
developed in recent economic and tax lit-
erature.
The provided analysis allowed us to 
underline the three types of tax competi-
tion models: traditional, asymmetric and 
Leviathan models. 
The first attempt to understand the 
problem of tax competition on the local 
level was made by Oates (1972), who con-
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sidered that «The result of tax competi-
tion may well be a tendency toward less 
than efficient level of output of local ser-
vices. In an attempt to keep taxes low to 
attract business investment, local officials 
may hold spending below those levels for 
which marginal benefits equal marginal 
costs, particularly for those programs that 
do not offer direct benefit to local busi-
ness» [20, p. 143].
Further Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986) presented a formalized basic tax 
competition model with a national sys-
tem of competing local governments in 
order to show how the use of a distort-
ing property tax on mobile capital could 
reduce the level of residential public ser-
vices. The main conclusion derived from 
their model is that the mobility of capital 
could lead to the both non-optimal low 
capital taxation and under-provision of 
public goods [21, p. 2; 22]. 
Wilson (1999) noted that this view 
runs counter to the «Tiebout Hypothesis» 
[23, p. 270]. According to this hypothesis 
the competition between local govern-
ments for mobile households could im-
prove the total social welfare. Tiebout 
(1956) concluded that if consumers were 
fully mobile, the appropriate local govern-
ments with definite patterns of revenue 
and expenditure would be adopted by the 
consumers [24, p. 424].
If some households want to have well-
financed public goods, they could choose to 
pay higher property taxes. Otherwise, they 
could move to a territory with lower taxes 
and more efficient public services. Thus, 
the competition among governments tends 
to encourage both efficient production and 
provision of public services, which satisfy 
the consumers’ demands. Consequently, 
the level of taxes established in certain ju-
risdiction reflects the results of tax compe-
tition. According to Edwards & de Rugy 
(2002), Tiebout’s theory focuses on local 
governments but under current conditions 
of globalization, national governments be-
come similar to local ones since they com-
pete for investors- taxpayers across nation-
al borders [25, p. 14].
In 1988 Wildasin modified the Zod-
row-Mieszkowski model, by including a 
finite number of countries that, in turn, 
could have an impact on the after-tax re-
turn to capital. But despite this assump-
tion, the results were the similar, i.e. taxes 
were still found to be low and suboptimal, 
but there were some quantitative differ-
ences [21, p. 6; 26]. 
Janeba & Schjelderup (2002), provid-
ing a review of the tax competition lit-
erature, considered the main restrictions 
which could effect on the conclusions of 
both Zodrow-Mieszkowski and Wildasin 
models of tax competition. Notably they 
distinguished variable supply of capital, 
multiple tax instruments, foreign owner-
ship, double taxation, public input goods, 
public goods spillover effects, large re-
gions, etc. [27].
In order to eliminate in some degree 
these limitations a set of asymmetric mod-
els of tax competition was developed (see 
for example, Bucovetsky (1991) [28], Keen 
&Kanbur (1993) [29], Krogstrup (2002) 
[21], Wilson (1991) [23]).
These models consider a proposition 
that market share of certain jurisdiction is 
inversely related both to its tax rate and 
allocative efficiency [30, p. 20]. 
But their conclusions were similar to 
the precedent models: the larger country 
would face a lower elasticity of capital 
to the tax rate, and consequently a lower 
marginal cost of public funds, and accord-
ingly would choose a higher tax rate as 
compared to the smaller country [21, p. 8].
The separate group of models which 
considers the interaction between tax 
competition and welfare are the Leviathan 
models (see for example Edwards & Keen 
(1996) [31]), based on the ideas of Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980) [32]. In Leviathan 
models the government’s goal is either to 
maximize the size of the state (i.e. the tax 
revenue) or its own consumption or util-
ity. Notably in Edwards & Keen model the 
government concerns about maximizing 
the size of the public sector [23, p. 1073].
According to Krosgrup (2002) the 
main differences between the conclusions 
of Leviathan models and both «tradition-
al» and asymmetric tax competition mod-
els are normative. She noted that «both 
types of models predict a fall in the tax 
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rate due to an increase in capital mobil-
ity, but in the Leviathan model, this fall 
enhances efficiency by constraining a ten-
dency to spend too much and too waste-
fully, while if the government is benevo-
lent, the downward pressure on the rate 
will lead to a sub-optimally low provision 
of public goods» [21, pp. 14–15].
Economic theory predicts that inter-
national tax competition could help to 
keep tax rates closer to their optimal level 
in order to constrain excessive govern-
ment surplus. The more mobile will be 
both capital and labor, the more competi-
tive pressure will exist [24].
To some detail, these benefits could be 
described as follows.
Positive impact on markets, since the 
lower taxes mean the greater wealth. Nota-
bly the lower taxes, particularly on mobile 
investment capital, have the beneficial im-
pact on savings rates, encourage savings.
Positive impact on global capital markets. 
The widespread opinion is that tax heav-
ens could lead to significant distortions 
in the global capital market by attracting 
disproportionate amounts of investment 
to these jurisdictions. 
But according to the Teather (2005), 
tax havens could be regarded as an im-
portant instrument in the global capital 
market, which is characterized by imper-
fect system of avoiding of double taxation. 
Tax heavens thereby make international 
capital markets more efficient, by increas-
ing the available international investment 
capital, and creating possibility to invest 
it into the high profit companies, without 
distortions induced by the need to prevent 
double taxation.
Positive impact on business. Jurisdic-
tions with lower level of tax burden give 
to investors a possibility to choose where 
to invest their capital. This is of particular 
interest for developing countries which 
often do not have enough domestic capital 
and thus should rely on the foreign one. 
Positive impact on government. This 
could be considered both from the posi-
tions of restraints and efficiency. 
The tax competition could have posi-
tive impact on the government since the 
former induces government to produce 
public goods and to provide public servic-
es more effectively, since under absence 
of competition monopolists have fewer 
incentives to be efficient and to provide 
necessary public goods and services. 
The positive impact from the point 
of view of efficiency means that under 
competition framework, governments 
face the restricted ability to increase rev-
enue by raising the level of tax burden 
[19, pp. 26–35]. 
But the opponents of the tax competi-
tion argue, in turn, that it will have little 
impact on actual investment allocation de-
cisions and thus the efficiency gains from 
such competition are minimum at best 
and these efficiency gains are outbalanced 
by the social losses occurred as a result of 
reduced tax revenue or sub-optimal tax 
measures aimed at prevention of tax rev-
enue decrease (see for example Avi-Yonan 
(2000) [33], Roin (2000) [34]).
But according to OECD (1998), the tax 
competition policies, notably tax heavens, 
could lead to substantial negative practi-
cal consequences:
– distorting of capital and investment 
flows;
– violating the integrity and fairness 
of the tax system;
– discouraging compliance by tax-
payers;
– shifting the tax burden towards less 
mobile factors of production;
– increasing the cost of tax adminis-
tration and compliance both for taxpayers 
and tax authorities [35, p. 24; 36, p. 16].
From the point of view of the regula-
tory standards Drezner (2006) determined 
three main predictions of occurrence of 
the race to the bottom situation. 
First, countries that are more open 
to foreign trade and FDI should have 
fewer regulations affecting the costs of 
production.
Second, he considered a strong nega-
tive correlation between inward capital 
flows and the rigidity of regulatory stan-
dards in the country, since the multina-
tional corporations in order to maximize 
their profit would locate in areas with 
minimum costs of production. Third, 
when one government lowers its regula-
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tory standards in order to attract more 
investment, other open economies, espe-
cially neighboring countries, will follow it. 
And according to the theory of the race to 
the bottom, states will have no choice but 
to lower their standards; otherwise they 
will face capital outfl ow [37, pp. 5–6]. 
The decision of the one state to reduce 
the corporate income tax rates by using 
tax incentives leads to certain fi scal exter-
nalities for other jurisdictions. Sokolovska 
(2014) distinguished the following fi scal 
externalities.
1. The shifting of factors of production 
into the jurisdictions with low level of tax 
burden, which leads to erosion of the tax 
base from jurisdictions with higher level 
of taxes. Even if the latter provides public 
services with higher quality in a whole, the 
additional expenditure could be incurred 
by those sectors, in which the voters, but 
not the investors, are interested (for exam-
ple, the social services). In such a case the 
difference in services will not compensate 
the higher tax rate for the companies. This 
is called the «horizontal externality». It in-
cludes also the migration between coun-
tries with different tax regimes as consid-
ered by Razin & Sadka (2013) [38].
2. In case when federal government 
changes the tax rate it has an impact on 
the tax base of all sub-sovereigns, which, 
in turn, induces an appropriate reaction 
of each entity, i.e. the vertical externalities 
[39, p. 1]. According to the Keen & Konrad 
such externalities could lead to the high 
tax burden, thereby worsening the posi-
tion of the federal state compared at the 
unitary one [3, p. 51]. 
3. The countries with high level of tax-
ation and providing due to this increasing 
public services could not reduce the tax 
rates in order to compete with jurisdic-
tions, providing tax incentives to attract 
investment (for satisfying the appropriate 
social needs). In general, such countries 
with high level of taxation could main-
tain the necessary level of public services 
by increasing other taxes, but this policy 
could lead to the adverse effects and nega-
tively infl uence of equity and effi ciency 
principles. 
4. The companies operating in two or 
more jurisdictions could choose appro-
priate taxes by providing the intra-group 
transactions and by shifting their income 
into countries with low tax burden. Con-
sequently, the competition induced by 
levying of low taxes, leads to the losses of 
fi scal resources both for jurisdictions with 
high tax burden and for the fi scal system 
of the union as a whole [40, pp. 88–89].
Taking all above mentioned into ac-
count, as intermediate conclusion, we 
developed a general pattern of race to the 
bottom and its consequences (Fig. 1).
 
«Beggar-thy-neighbor» 
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Fig. 1. General pattern of race to the bottom and its consequences
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Analytical estimation of the dynamics 
of statutory corporate income tax rates
Let’s briefl y analyze the dynamics of 
statutory corporate income tax rates (STR) 
in countries worldwide. In order to make 
some conclusions we divided countries by 
regions since the tax competition as well 
as the race to the bottom is typical primar-
ily for the neighboring countries. 
So, for our analysis we distinguished 
four regions: Europe, Latin America, Af-
rica and countries of the former USSR. 
We used panel data for 70 countries for 
the period of 2006–2015.
European countries, in turn, were 
divided into three «sub-regions», ac-
cording their geographical loca-
tion: Northern, Central and Southern 
Europe. 
Fig. 2–4 presents the changes of statu-
tory corporate income tax rates in Euro-
pean countries for 2006–2015.
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Fig. 2. Statutory corporate income tax rates in Southern Europe
Source: Corporate tax rates table. Available at: https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/
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Source: Corporate tax rates table. Available at: https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/
tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html
Journal of Tax Reform, 2016, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 98–110
107
ISSN 2412-8872
In Central Europe there were no sig-
nifi cant changes in statutory corporate 
income tax rates, while in other «sub-re-
gions» starting from 2012 these tax rates 
were reduced in the United Kingdom, 
Finland, Denmark, Sweden (Northern Eu-
rope) and increased in Albania, Serbia and 
Greece (Southern Europe).
The possible reason of such differenc-
es consists both in the pattern of tax poli-
cy and level of development of countries’ 
tax systems, when in order to increase the 
tax revenue the less developed countries 
raise the tax rates, while the developed 
ones reduce the tax burden and simulta-
neously look for other ways of raising the 
tax revenue.
Fig. 5 describes the dynamics of nomi-
nal corporate income tax rates in countries 
of Latin America. 
The same trend as in Central Europe 
countries could be observed: there were 
no signifi cant changes, except Chile and 
Ecuador with gradual increase and reduc-
tion, respectively, of statutory corporate 
income tax rates. The former country pro-
vides an appropriate tax policy in order to 
compensate the losses of budget revenue 
occurred due to shift from shareholder 
taxation on a cash basis to taxation on an 
accrual basis. Ecuador has an opportunity 
to reduce statutory income tax rates (in or-
der to attract FDI), since the government 
receives a signifi cant oil tax revenue.
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Source: Corporate tax rates table. Available at: https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/
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Fig. 5. Statutory corporate income tax rates in Latin America
Source: Corporate tax rates table. Available at: https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/
tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html
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On Fig. 6 the changes of statutory cor-
porate income tax rates in countries of the 
former USSR are presented. 
Belarus, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, 
starting from 2010–2011, have gradually 
reduced statutory income tax rates. The 
main goal of such tax policy is to stimu-
late both innovation and investment ac-
tivity. 
The most interesting is the situation 
with dynamics of nominal corporate 
income tax rates in African countries 
(Fig. 7). 
In many countries of this region (An-
gola, Cameroon, Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe) these rates have 
decreased over the last years, which corre-
sponds to the general trend for the African 
region. 
It can be explained by the fact that tax 
systems of these countries are weak, and 
they could compete with each other, pri-
marily by reducing tax rates. Again, this 
is the region where the simplest tax incen-
tives, like reduced tax rates, tax heavens 
etc., are the most widespread. 
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Fig. 6. Statutory corporate income tax rates in countries of the former USSR
Source: Corporate tax rates table. Available at: https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/
tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html
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Conclusions
We briefly considered some conceptu-
al issues concerning the international tax 
completion and the race to the bottom sit-
uation as its negative externality. The pro-
vided analysis allowed us to determine 
the three types of tax competition models: 
traditional, asymmetric and Leviathan 
models, and their main features. 
Using the means of comparative and 
graphical analysis we provide an evalua-
tion of dynamics of statutory corporate in-
come tax rates in countries worldwide. We 
discovered that in Europe, Latin America 
and countries of the former USSR there 
were no significant changes in statutory 
corporate income tax rates while in African 
countries they have changed substantially.
But in order to make some conclusions 
both about taxation of corporate income 
and possibility of presence of the race-to-
bottom situation in this region, the real tax 
rates, taking into account the tax incentives 
and eliminations should be considered. 
This means that one should estimate 
not only the dynamics of statutory capital 
income tax rates, but also changes of ef-
fective average capital income tax rates 
(EATR), which measure the effective tax 
burden of projects that earn more than the 
capital costs (i.e. projects generating eco-
nomic rents) and is calculated as the differ-
ence between the pre-tax and the post-tax 
return of the project divided by the pre-tax 
return, and of effective marginal capital in-
come tax rates (EMTR), measuringthe extra 
tax of a marginal investment project and 
defined as the difference between the pre-
tax and the post-tax return of this project 
divided by the pre-tax return. Therefore, 
this will be the direction of future research. 
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